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Abstract 
This note studies the impact of immigration on welfare state generosity in 12 Western European 
countries. In estimations not coping with the possible endogeneity problem, there are indications of 
a negative relationship between immigration and welfare state generosity. However, when the 
distance to the Balkan wars are used as a source of exogenous variation in the immigrant share, as to 
overcome potential endogeneity in mobility across countries, our findings suggest that an increase in 
the immigrant share does not decrease welfare state generosity.  
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1. Introduction 
Alesina, et al. (2001) show that in countries (as well as in US states) with higher racial fragmentation 
redistribution is lower. A possible explanation for this is that people support welfare spending and 
redistribution to their own ethnic group, but not to other ethnic groups. As argued by Caplan (2012) 
immigration could thus be expected to make the welfare state smaller, since more immigrants 
reduce the welfare state support of natives. However, Rodrik (1998), and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) 
suggests that when there are high external risks, individuals will demand more social security and 
therefore a larger welfare state. Following this line of argument Finseraas (2008) argue that 
immigration increases the perceived exposure to risk, indicating that immigration could increase 
welfare state generosity. One might also argue that immigration gives a higher share of the 
population that is clearly in need of the welfare state. The natives might become more in favor of 
solidarity in general, and the welfare state in particular, when they get reminded of that the world is 
truly an unjust world. It may be hard to not support generosity when it is so obvious that many 
people really need help. A fourth possibility is that keeping the same insurance level as before 
becomes very expensive when immigration increases; this forces societies to become less generous, 
not because people supports the welfare state less, but because it simply becomes too expensive to 
keep the previous insurance level. Thus there may be opposing mechanisms at work regarding the 
effect of immigration on welfare state generosity. The aim of the present paper is to investigate if 
increases in the share of foreigners have decreased welfare state generosity in Western Europe.  
 
It is well documented that welfare state generosity has decreased since the 1980s (Allan and Scruggs, 
2004, Korpi and Palme, 2003). There is also evidence that increased ethnic diversity in an area can 
make people less willing to support redistribution (Dahlberg, et al., 2012). To what extent increased 
diversity leads to lower welfare generosity is less studied, but Soroka, et al. (2006) find that increases 
in the migrant stock was associated with lower increases in social welfare spending in 18 OECD 
countries 1970-1998. However, as pointed out by Korpi and Palme (2003), and Allan and Scruggs 
(2004) social welfare spending is not a good measure of welfare generosity. Using an index based on 
citizen rights to social insurance is a better way of measuring welfare state generosity than using 
expenditure-based measures. What we would like to measure is to what extent the welfare state 
actually insures the individual from income loss, not governmental spending per se. 
 
In the present paper we study the relationship between welfare state generosity and the immigrant 
share in 12 Western European countries 1980-1999. Since the choice of where to migrate may be 
directly affected by welfare state generosity identification of the effects of immigrants on generosity 
is challenging. E.g. people may choose to move to countries with high or low welfare state 
generosity, and countries with high (low) generosity may be more (less) reluctant towards 
immigration. Following Angrist and Kugler (2003), and Speciale (2012) closely, the distance from the 
Balkan wars are used as a source of exogenous variation in the immigrant share, to overcome 
potential endogeneity in mobility across countries. The findings suggest that an increase in the 
immigrant share does not decrease welfare state generosity as measured by the generosity index. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes a presentation of the data sources 
used, and a description of the data. In Section 3 the empirical strategy and the empirical results are 
presented. Section 4 concludes by discussing the findings and pointing to some issues for future 
research. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
The welfare benefit generosity index (Generosity) is obtained from Scruggs (2006). The index is based 
on net income replacement rates, workforce coverage, length of qualifying periods, and duration of 
benefits in sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, and pensions. High scores indicate a more 
generous system, and the index varies theoretically from 0 to 64. The data covers 18 OECD countries 
(13 from Western Europe) for the period 1971-2002. Using an index based on citizen rights to social 
insurance is generally viewed as a better way of measuring welfare state generosity than using 
expenditure-based measures, since the latter are for example directly related to changes in GDP. 
Thus, an economic downturn can appear as an increase in welfare-state generosity when using 
expenditure based measures. Changes in the dependent population may also mask cuts or 
expansions at the individual level: if unemployment increases while the individual right benefits 
decrease, spending measures may not capture the change on the individual level. More importantly, 
what we would like to measure is to what extent the welfare state actually insures the individual 
from income loss, not governmental spending. These arguments have been developed in greater 
length by and Korpi and Palme (2003), and Allan and Scruggs (2004). 
 
Good data on the number of immigrants in a country covering many countries and many years is 
sparse, in the present paper we use what we believe is the best available data. The main 
independent variable in this paper is Foreign which builds on data from OECD International Migration 
Statistics on the stock of foreigners, and population data from the World Development indicators. 
Foreign is defined as foreign citizen recorded in the population register, in line with previous studies 
using the same identification strategy (Angrist and Kugler, 2003, Speciale, 2012). This means that 
countries that are generous in letting immigrants become citizens will appear to have fewer 
immigrants than they actually do have, this problem should, however, be larger in the longer run 
since citizenship is not granted very fast in any of the investigated countries. In Denmark asylum 
seekers and all persons with temporary residence permits are excluded, but for Germany asylum 
seekers living in private households are included. For the Netherlands asylum seekers are included. 
For several countries the documentation is unclear about how asylum seekers are treated in the 
statistics (Svensson, et al., 2012). 
 
Our control variables are meant to represent a “standard” model of welfare state policy. Here, we 
have been inspired by prolific large-N studies of government partisanship, including Korpi and Palme 
(2003), Allan and Scruggs (2004), as well as other more recent studies (Rothstein, et al., 2012). 
Included are trade openness (exports and imports as a share of GDP) from Heston, et al. (2011), and 
financial openness (a measure of liberalization of current transactions ranging from 0 to 8) from 
Huber, et al. (2004) (originally from Quinn (1997)), as measures of economic globalization. To control 
for business cycles we include  growth in GDP per capita in constant prices from Heston, et al. (2011), 
the percentage unemployed (Armingeon, et al., 2008), and the government budget deficit as a share 
of GDP (IMF, 2007). We also control for corporatist wage bargaining ((Huber, et al., 2004); originally 
from (Quinn, 1997)), and executive veto power, which takes the value 1 if there is an executive with 
constitutional veto power over laws passed by the legislature, 0 otherwise (Regan and Clark, 2010). 
These two variables are included since it may be the case that they decrease the probabilities of 
retrenchment or expansion. All variables used in the paper were taken from the secondary source 
provided by the QoG Social Policy Dataset (Svensson, et al., 2012). 
 
For 12 Western European countries we have information on all variables for at least 9 years and at 
most 20 years between 1980 and 1999, we thus have an unbalanced panel. Of the 13 Western 
European countries included in the generosity data, France lacks sufficient observations on the share 
of foreigners and is therefore excluded from the analysis. In total we have 191 year/country 
observations. The countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 1. The generosity index varies from 18 (United Kingdom) to 45 (Sweden) with 
a mean of 32. The share of immigrants varies from almost zero (Finland) to 19 percent (Switzerland)1, 
with a mean of 5.5 percent. Even though the variation between countries is larger, there is clearly 
variation within countries as well. Descriptive statistics of the instrumental variables used is also 
                                                 
1
 Switzerland having the highest share of immigrants might be surprising at a first glance. But Switzerland has a 
lot of immigrants from other EU countries. The issue of different groups of immigrants is discussed in the 
conclusions. 
presented in Table 1, a discussion of the instruments and the identification strategy is found below 
(Section 3). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Overall 
std.dev 
Between 
std.dev 
Within 
std.dev 
Generosity 31.731 17.992 45.378 7.193 7.237 1.579 
Immigrants 5.533 0.347 19.169 4.420 4.336 0.974 
Trade openness 63.900 32.719 135.427 21.052 19.237 9.760 
GDP growth 2.044 -7.451 9.457 2.166 0.572 2.097 
Unemployment 7.572 0.185 17.147 4.243 3.817 2.178 
Right share 32.040 0 100 32.884 23.526 24.298 
Financial openness 7.269 5 8 1.051 0.618 0.876 
Veto points 0.709 0 1 0.709 0.451 0.153 
Budget deficit -2.964 -15.731 9.733 4.541 3.282 3.150 
Corporatism 3.635 1 5 1.132 0.962 0.665 
Instruments 
Bosnia war 
instrument 
0.087 0 1.153 0.266 0.048 0.263 
Inter-war 
instrument 
0.249 0 1.294 0.419 0.122 0.404 
Kosovo war 
instrument 
0.101 0 1.256 0.303 0.052 0.299 
 
3. Estimation and results 
3.1 Naïve estimations 
As a first step in studying the relationship between immigration and welfare state generosity we do 
not consider the possible endogeneity of the Foreign variable. We estimate several variants of the 
following equation: 
 
                                             ,    (1) 
 
where i denotes the country, and t denotes the year. αi is a country dummy, θt is a time dummy, 
Immigrantsit-1, is the share of immigrants in country i period t-1, xit-1 is a vector of control variables, 
and εit is an unobserved time invariant disturbance term. The estimations are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Welfare generosity as dependent variable, 1980-1999 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RE RE RE FE FE FE 
Immigrants (% of pop)t-1 -0.419 -0.935*** -1.619*** -0.594 -0.757 -0.495 
 (0.511) (0.186) (0.232) (0.797) (0.876) (0.840) 
Trade opennesst-1  0.180*** 0.176***  -0.076 -0.060 
  (0.061) (0.043)  (0.064) (0.059) 
GDP growtht-1  -0.485* -0.447**  -0.037 -0.035 
  (0.294) (0.189)  (0.048) (0.048) 
Unemploymentt-1  -1.174*** -0.839**  -0.199* -0.241* 
  (0.369) (0.370)  (0.109) (0.113) 
Right sharet-1   -0.017   -0.012** 
   (0.027)   (0.005) 
Financial opennesst-1   0.902   0.334 
   (0.874)   (0.326) 
Veto pointst-1   -9.721***   1.150 
   (2.620)   (1.065) 
Budget deficitt-1   0.251   -0.110 
   (0.230)   (0.063) 
Corporatismt-1   1.281   0.504** 
   (0.866)   (0.172) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables 
lagged one year. 
 
According to a Wald test we reject the null hypothesis that all year coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero, therefore year effects are included in all models. In the first three columns in Table 2 we 
present random effects regressions with successively more control variables. As more control 
variables are included the negative relationship between the immigrant share and welfare state 
generosity gets stronger. It should, however, be noted that if the relationship between immigration 
and generosity partly goes via some of the control variables (for example via unemployment or right 
share in the cabinet), including them may mask the true relationship.  We do not want to control for 
variables which are themselves potentially influenced by immigration. A Hausman test suggests that 
fixed effects should be included in our model, thus columns 4-6 in Table 2 includes country fixed 
effects. Also in these regressions the relationship is negative, but never statistically significant. Since 
we may have problems with endogeneity, these results should though not be interpreted in a causal 
way, in the next section we therefore turn to IV estimations trying to control for endogeneity in 
immigration. 
 
3.2 IV estimates 
To identify the effect of increased immigration on welfare state generosity we follow the 
identification strategy used by Angrist and Kugler (2003), and later by Speciale (2012) closely, where 
the Balkan wars are considered an exogenous shock in immigration in Western European countries. 
Angrist and Kugler (2003) show that the number of Yugoslavs among European immigrants increased 
sharply during the Balkan wars (Bosnia war 1991-1995, and Kosovo war 1998-1999), as well as the 
inter-war years (1996-1997). Thus, the distance from the Balkan conflicts is a good predictor of the 
foreign share in Western European countries. In our instrumental variable (IV) estimations the 
excluded instruments are therefore: the distance from Sarajevo * dummy for 1991-1995 (Bosnia war 
years), the distance from Sarajevo * dummy for 1996-1997 (inter-war years), and the distance from 
Pristina * dummy for 1998-1999 (Kosovo war years). The distance is the miles (divided by 1000) to 
the nearest city with a population of at least 100,000. 
 
The first stage results (Table 3) show that the share of immigrants is indeed correlated with the 
chosen instruments. This is supported by the F-statistic for excluded instruments, which is clearly 
above the rule of tumb threshold of 10 (15.20, 12.82, an 14.77). This implies that the instruments are 
good predictors of the share of immigrants, and that the predicted values have enough variation to 
be used as instruments. The Sargan test (overidentification test) suggests that the instruments are 
valid. This implies that the instruments do not seem to affect welfare generosity directly, but only the 
share of immigrants, as we have assumed. A test for endogeneity rejects that the share of 
immigrants can be treated as an exogenous regressor, so the IV-estimations are preferred over the 
ordinary fixed effects estimations.  
 
Table 3. Immigrants as dependent variable, first stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Bosnia war instrument -2.749*** 
(0.631) 
-2.608*** 
(0.645) 
-2.624*** 
(0.548) 
Inter-war instrument -2.343*** 
(0.403) 
-2.189*** 
(0.403) 
-2.208*** 
(0.394) 
Kosovo war instrument -2.913*** 
(0.884) 
-2.574*** 
(0.956) 
-2.554*** 
(0.828) 
Controls No Three All 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 191 191 191 
Number of countries 12 12 12 
F-stat. of excl. instr. 15.20 12.82 14.77 
Sargan p-value 0.928 0.810 0.572 
Test for endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: First stage regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Control variables are lagged one year. The included controls in column 2 are: Trade openness, GDP 
growth, and Unemployment. In column 3 also Right share, Financial openness, Veto points, Budget 
deficit, and Corporatism are included. 
 
 
In Table 4 we present the results from fixed effects IV regressions. When we consider the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations the coefficient actually turns positive, but rather small and 
only marginally statistically significant. These results are contrary to the correlations found in Table 2. 
The results are very similar if we include longer lag lengths of the immigration variable (these results 
are available upon request). As noted above, if the relationship between immigration and generosity 
partly goes via some of the control variables (for example via unemployment or right share in the 
cabinet), including them may mask the true relationship. Even though our parameter estimates are 
not statistically significant different from zero, immigration may effect welfare state generosity 
modestly upwards or downwards. 
 
Our results suggests that the estimates without instruments are biased negatively (-0.594 <0.444) 
and this may be seen as surprising. One might for example believe that people would move to 
countries that they expect to increase their generosity. However, there might be other factors 
related to generosity that affects immigration. One possibility is that countries with more generous 
welfare states are also more restrictive towards immigration. 
 
Table 4. Welfare generosity as dependent variable, 1980-1999, IV estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FE-IV FE-IV FE-IV 
Immigrants (% of pop)t-1 0.444 0.186 0.545* 
 (0.335) (0.361) (0.321) 
Controls No Three All 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 191 191 191 
Number of countries 12 12 12 
F-stat. of excl. instr. 15.20 12.82 12.82 
Sargan p-value 0.928 0.810 0.810 
Test for endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the IV regressions, 
the endogenous regressor is Immigrants. Control variables are lagged one year. The included controls 
in column 2 are: Trade openness, GDP growth, and Unemployment. In column 3 also Right share, 
Financial openness, Veto points, Budget deficit, and Corporatism are included. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of immigration on welfare state generosity in 12 Western European 
countries. Following Angrist and Kugler (2003), and Speciale (2012), the distance from the Balkan 
wars is used as a source of exogenous variation in the immigrant share, to overcome potential 
endogeneity in mobility across countries. We found no statistically significant effect of immigration 
levels on welfare state generosity. If anything, the instrumental variable estimations suggests small 
increases in welfare state generosity following increases in the share of immigrants. Our study has 
fairly good power and only quite moderate negative effects are within the confidence interval. 
 
To interpret the results correctly we must, however, consider what local average treatment effect 
(LATE) we are actually measuring. Our findings show that the inflow of Yugoslav immigrants to 
Western European countries following the Balkan wars during the 1990s, did not decrease welfare 
state generosity in Western Europe. Since the Yugoslav immigrants were mainly low skilled and had a 
labor market participation rate similar to that of other non-EU immigrants (Angrist and Kugler, 2003), 
we could expect our findings to apply more generally. However, our findings are not as relevant for 
immigrants less similar to the 1990s inflow of Yugoslavs, e.g. highly educated immigrants from other 
European countries. 
 
Our findings do not support the hypothesis suggesting that increased immigration lead to lower 
welfare state generosity. One potential explanation for this is presented by Rodrik (1998), suggesting 
that when there is a high external risk natives will demand more social security. Another possibility is 
that solidarity was boosted by having people in need entering European countries. Yet another 
possibility is that changes in the arrangement of welfare state regimes might have taken place, 
without leading to a reduction in general citizen rights to social insurance.  
 
Clayton and Pontusson (1998) notice a change in welfare-state design in the member states of the 
European Union, where less weight is given to universalistic components in exchange for greater 
weight on social-insurance-based welfare. Since social-insurance benefits are typically based on 
income from employment, such programs sidestep the political problem of foreigners taking 
advantage of generous benefits (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998). Thus, it may be the case that 
immigration may have decreased welfare state generosity in areas not picked up by the welfare 
generosity index used here. Studying the immigration effects on the universalistic components of the 
welfare state is therefore of importance for future research. If such changes in the welfare state have 
taken place this is no proof of people supporting welfare spending and redistribution to their own 
ethnic group, but not to other ethnic groups. The changes can be explained by that the welfare state 
becomes more costly when there is more immigrants with needs, at the same time as people’s 
preferences for a welfare state is unchanged. 
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